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Various kinds of normative judgments are an integral part of everyday life. We extended the scrutiny of social cognitive
neuroscience into the domain of legal decisions, investigating two groups, lawyers and other academics, during moral and
legal decision-making. While we found activation of brain areas comprising the so-called ’moral brain’ in both conditions,
there was stronger activation in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and middle temporal gyrus particularly when subjects
made legal decisions, suggesting that these were made in respect to more explicit rules and demanded more complex semantic
processing. Comparing both groups, our data show that behaviorally lawyers conceived themselves as emotionally less involved
during normative decision-making in general. A group condition interaction in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex suggests a
modulation of normative decision-making by attention based on subjects’ normative expertise.
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INTRODUCTION
Normative judgments are ubiquitous in everyday life. For
example, judging people as tall or small, or as beautiful or
unsightly, refers to respective norms. Besides these examples
of normativity in a wide sense, there is one particularly
strong understanding related to norms of right or wrong
human conduct. One kind of such norms, namely moral
norms, has previously been subject to experimental psychol-
ogy and social, cognitive and affective neuroscience. Some
researchers speak of a ‘moral brain’ comprising areas in
the frontal, temporal and parietal lobes as well as limbic
structures (see, e.g. Greene and Haidt, 2002; Moll and de
Oliveira-Souza, 2007), involving brain areas associated with
a variety of tasks of social cognition. But not only moral
norms are related to right or wrong human conduct. The
domain of law, as it is formulated and applied, poses another
example that is of high relevance to our social life. What
happens on the neural level if subjects are engaged in legal
reasoning and judgment? Is there an overlap between brain
activation during legal and moral decision-making or are
different regions involved in the legal condition? And does
such neuroscientific knowledge imply anything for our
understanding of normative decision-making?
The tension between moral and legal norms is illustrated
by debates in the scholarly literature, where the application
of legal rules is contrasted with the reliance on moral intu-
itions (Goodenough, 2001; Goodenough and Prehn, 2004).
The predominant view conceives law ideally as purely ratio-
nal, free from emotion and passion (Gewirtz, 1996). In the
light of recent scientific evidence emphasizing the role of
emotion and intuition in moral perception and judgment
(Haidt, 2001; Greene and Haidt, 2002; Heekeren et al.,
2003; Greene et al., 2004; Moll et al., 2005; Koenigs et al.,
2007; Ciaramelli et al., 2007), it is pertinent to know whether
legal judgments are also subject to people’s emotions and
intuitions. Although we do not think that neuroimaging
data can prove or disprove stances in philosophy of law,
we are convinced that such empirical investigations can
shed new light on these rather theoretical debates.
Considering the recent discussion about the neuroscienti-
fic implications for the legal system (Goodenough and
Prehn, 2004; Greene and Cohen, 2004; Garland, 2005; Zeki
and Goodenough, 2006; Mobbs et al., 2007; Tovino, 2007;
Gazzaniga, 2008), sometimes even referred to as ‘neurolaw’
(Wolf, 2008; Schleim et al., 2009), it is apparent that neu-
roimaging research so far has concentrated on investigating
criminals and psychopaths (Blair, 2008; Yang et al., 2008)
or developing forensic applications such as lie detection
(Sip et al., 2008; Spence et al., 2004). By contrast, we were
also interested in investigating what impact legal expertise
would have on the neural mechanisms of normative cogni-
tion and thus investigated two groups, experienced lawyers
and other academics.
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While a recent neuroimaging study addressed punishment
of legal transgressions (Buckholtz et al., 2008), we focused on
a more basic step in the process of legal decision-making that
precedes the assessment of punishment, namely the decision
whether an action is considered as legally right or wrong.
We constructed short stories that could be evaluated from a
moral as well as a legal point of view and the subjects were
confronted with these stories in our fMRI experiment.
They had to decide whether behaviors were right or wrong
from either of these points of view. As stories were rando-
mized over subjects, we were able to investigate the impact
of the context or the framing (moral vs legal) independent
of the respective story’s concrete content.
The rational of our investigation consisted in testing the
following three hypotheses. First, we wanted to test whether
activations within the ‘moral brain’ could also be found
during legal judgment. Given that the evaluation of norma-
tive behaviors depends on the attribution of beliefs and
intentions, as has been suggested by the so-called
‘Rawlsian’ model in moral psychology (Hauser, 2006;
Huebner et al., 2009), we expected an overlap in brain
regions related to mentalizing and theory of mind (TOM)
such as the medial prefrontal cortex (Walter et al., 2004;
Amodio and Frith, 2006; Singer, 2006; Lieberman, 2007)
and the temporo-parietal junction (Gallagher et al., 2000;
Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Frith and Singer, 2008;
Adolphs, 2009) when comparing the moral and legal with
the neutral condition. With our second hypothesis, we
wanted to investigate the differences between moral and
legal judgment in the light of the traditional understanding
of law separating moral intuitions from the rational appli-
cation of legal rules (Gewirtz, 1996; Goodenough, 2001). We
thus expected stronger brain activation in areas related to
rule-based decision-making such as the dorsolateral prefron-
tal cortex (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Bunge, 2004) for legal
decisions. Third, we assumed that as a function of expertise,
lawyers would pay more attention to normatively salient
features than other academics and thus show less activation
related to processing of emotions, such as the amygdala
(Dalgleish, 2004), during normative decision-making.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Our participants were 46 healthy adults without reported
history of psychiatric or neurological disorders. Four of
them did not complete the experimental design and two
had incidental findings that were dealt with according
to our ethical guidelines (Schleim et al., 2007). Out of
the 40 remaining subjects (22 male; 31.05 4.02 years of
age; 20.31 1.91 years of education; all right-handed;
mean s.d.), 20 were qualified lawyers having attained the
German second state examination and 20 were other aca-
demics matched for age (31.95 3.69 vs 30.15 4.22 years,
respectively; P> 0.1), education (20.48 1.31 vs 20.13 1.91
years, respectively; P> 0.1) and gender (nine female in each
group). Experimental procedures were approved by the local
ethics committee and all subjects gave written informed
consent.
Experimental design
We developed 36 target stories adapted from moral and
legal issues in the media as well as the scholarly literature
and 18 control stories taken from everyday life experience
(see Supplementary Data), similar to Greene’s and col-
leagues’ control stimuli (Greene et al., 2001, 2004).
Importantly, target stories were constructed such that they
were understandable from the moral as well as the legal point
of view. Instructions were randomized between subjects and
were used to assign the normative cases to either the moral
or the legal condition as follows. Each trial began with a 2 s
presentation of a cue indicating the experimental condition,
‘neutral’, ‘moral’ or ‘legal’, followed by the story presented
together with the question whether this behavior was right
from either the personal, moral or legal view. Subjects had as
much time as necessary to make a decision, as in previous
research (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Borg et al., 2006), and
could answer either ‘yes, rightly’ or ‘no, not rightly’, using
buttons in both hands. The decision ended the trial that was
then followed by a centered crosshair for 12 s in order to
allow for blood-oxygene-level dependent (BOLD) relaxation.
The stimuli were presented on a computer screen using
fMRI-compatible video goggles (Nordic Neurolab, Bergen,
Norway) and Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems,
Albany, CA, USA). The stories were split equally into two
blocks of data acquisition (i.e. 27 stories per block) and
presented individually randomized for each subject. Before
entering the MRI scanner, subjects received written instruc-
tions and practiced the task with four additional stories,
two of them as moral, the other two as legal condition.
They had to acknowledge their understanding of the differ-
ence between both views before proceeding with the
experiment.
After the fMRI experiment, we presented all 54 stories
including the individual answers in random order on a PC
to the subjects and asked them to rate whether the story
touched them emotionally (emotion), how realistic they
found it (reality), how difficult they found their decision
(difficulty) and how certain they were about it (certainty).
Answers were recorded using five-point Likert scales ranging
from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’ for each question.
We calculated condition group ANOVAs for reaction
time, emotion, reality, difficulty and certainty in order to
test for main effects of condition (neutral, moral and
legal), group (lawyers, other academics) and group condi-
tion interactions. To ascertain whether normative context
shaped the subjects’ decision, we calculated an endorsement
score for each subject and condition by dividing the num-
ber of given yes-responses by the number of possible
yes-responses. These were analysed with a condition group
ANOVA. Paired tests were used to find significant
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differences between the individual experimental conditions,
corrected for multiple comparisons with Sidak’s method
(Sidak, 1967). SPSS Statistics 17 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL,
USA) was used for these statistical tests.
MRI acquisition
Images were acquired using a 3 T Siemens (Erlangen,
Germany) TRIO whole-body scanner and an eight-channel
head-coil. A high-resolution T1-weighed whole-brain ana-
tomical scan (1mm3 voxel resolution, MPRAGE) was
acquired prior to functional imaging. Functional images
were acquired in 31 axial slices using an echo planar imaging
(EPI) pulse sequence, with a TR of 1700ms, a TE of 25ms, a
flip angle of 808, a field of view of 192 192mm2, 3.03mm3
isotropic voxels and 0.75mm interslice spacing. The first
six images of each run were discarded for equilibration.
On average, 620.89 (81.78) volumes were recorded per
functional run.
fMRI preprocessing and analysis
Data were preprocessed and analysed using BrainVoyager
QX 1.9; the analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was per-
formed with the updated version 1.10.4 (BrainInnovation,
Maastricht, The Netherlands). Each subject’s anatomical
scan was converted manually into Talairach space.
Functional images were slice scan-time corrected, 3D
motion corrected, spatially smoothed using a 12mm
FWHM Gaussian filter to ameliorate differences in inter-
subject localization, and temporally filtered removing
linear trends as well as using a high pass filter (three
cycles). Functional images were co-registered to the anatom-
ical images using BrainVoyager’s alignment algorithms,
individually improved by manual adjustment, and then
transformed into Talairach space.
In analysis I, we defined one predictor for each of the
three conditions, starting with stimulus onset until 500ms
before button press. One additional predictor was defined
for the cues and two for left and right button presses,
comprising the last 500ms of each trial. The 12 s ISI after
button press until onset of the next cue was defined as
low-level baseline. Ours was thus a slow event fMRI
design. After calculating each subject’s individual design
matrix, convolving our predictors with BrainVoyager’s
BOLD function, we computed a random effects general
linear model removing voxels in the eyes with a mask and
used false discovery rate adjustment (Benjamini and
Hochberg, 1995) in order to correct for multiple compari-
sons on the q(FDR)< 0.005 level across the whole brain.
Because the stimuli of both normative conditions were
identical and the task was individually specified by the
question at the end of each story, we expected differences
between moral and legal decisions to occur closest to the
time of decision. We thus performed analysis II, in which
we defined one predictor (‘decision phase’) for each of the
three conditions comprising the last 10 s prior to decision
similar to Greene and colleagues’ 16 s time window (Greene
et al., 2001, 2004). The remaining variable time between
stimulus onset and decision phase was assigned to three
other predictors (‘reading phase’ of each condition; results
not reported here). Cues, button presses and ISI were
modeled as in analysis I. Differences between moral and
legal conditions were calculated as described before. Signal
time courses for decision phases were extracted using
BrainVoyager’s event-related averaging function. To test
for the influence of subjects’ differential (i.e. moral vs
legal) mean ratings of certainty, reality, difficulty and emo-
tion, we extracted mean beta values of each significant
cluster we found in this analysis and calculated correlations
using SPSS Statistics 17.
To investigate the effect of group and group condition
interactions, we performed a whole-brain ANCOVA with
one between-subjects factor (lawyer or other academic).
For the main effect of group analysis, subjects’ mean ratings
of certainty, reality, difficulty and emotion for the legal and
moral conditions were entered as covariates; for the
group condition interaction analysis, we calculated an
ANCOVA with the contrast beta map of both normative
conditions (moral vs legal) and the subjects’ differential
mean ratings were entered as covariates. To control for mul-
tiple comparisons, we initially set an uncorrected voxel-level
threshold at F¼ 14.83 (P< 0.0005) and subsequently used
Monte Carlo simulations with 10.000 iterations, yielding a
cluster-level false-positive rate at < 0.005 with a cluster size
of k¼ 4 27mm3 voxels. These calculations were performed
with BrainVoyager’s cluster-level statistical threshold estima-
tor (Goebel et al., 2006).
All coordinates are reported in Talairach space and ana-
tomical regions have been delineated manually according
to the atlas of Talairach and Tournoux (1988).
RESULTS
Behavioral results
A complete overview of behavioral results from the fMRI
experiment and the post-scan rating procedure is reported
in Table 1. There was a significant main effect of condition
[F(2,76)¼ 89.83, P< 0.001; see also Figure 1], with both
target conditions being judged as significantly more emo-
tional than those of the control condition (P< 0.001 each).
Furthermore, there was a significant group difference
[F(1,38)¼ 5.19, P< 0.05], because lawyers considered the
stimuli on average to be less emotional than other aca-
demics. The group condition interaction also reached
significance [F (2,76)¼ 3.60, P< 0.05]. Post hoc tests between
both groups showed that the rating did not differ signifi-
cantly in the neutral condition [t (38)¼0.98, P> 0.1],
but that lawyers were emotionally less involved in both
normative conditions [moral: t(38)¼2.45, P< 0.05; legal:
t(38)¼2.68, P< 0.05].
Regarding the decisions’ outcome, whether the person in
the presented story acted rightly, we found a significant
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main effect of condition when comparing moral and
legal judgments [F(1,38)¼ 7.05, P< 0.05; see also
Figure 1], with significantly higher endorsement in the
moral (0.44 0.14 s.d.) than in the legal (0.35 0.14 s.d.)
condition (P< 0.05). We observed no significant condi-
tion group interaction [F(1,38)¼ 0.41] or group difference
[F(1,38)¼ 0.01]. That is, subjects were significantly less
permissive of the normative behavior in the legal condition
and thus judged fewer of these actions as rightly.
The rating of certainty also deserves special attention, for
there was a significant effect of condition [F(2,76)¼ 6.1,
P< 0.01; see also Figure 1], where subjects felt significantly
less certain of their decisions in the legal condition
than in the other two (P< 0.01 and P< 0.05, respectively).
Fig. 1 Behavioral effects. The difference between groups in reported emotional involvement was significant, because lawyers reported to be less involved than other academics.
While there was no significant group difference for endorsement (yes-answer) of the normative issues presented in the stimulus material, subjects were significantly less
endorsing them in the legal condition (all error bars þ 1 SE; *P < 0.05, **P< 0.01, ***P < 0.001).
Table 1 Behavioral results of our 40 subjects from fMRI experiment and post-scan rating procedure
Mean values per condition GLM F Paired tests P
Neutral Moral Legal Condition Group Interact. m/n l/n l/m
Lawyers Other academics Lawyers Other academics Lawyers Other academics
Reaction Time 18.21 4.37 19.74 3.12 19.16 4.73 22.02 4.30 20.66 6.41 23.59 4.80 18.8*** 3 1.5 <0.01 <0.001 <0.01
Endorsement 0.42 0.07 0.43 0.13 0.43 0.13 0.45 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.34 0.13 5.9** 0 0.4 n.s. <0.05 <0.05
Emotion 1.82 0.58 2.01 0.66 2.59 0.66 3.14 0.65 2.47 0.76 3.01 0.64 89.8*** 5.2* 3.6* <0.001 <0.001 n.s.
Reality 3.88 0.74 3.84 0.54 3.75 0.62 3.50 0.48 3.86 0.55 3.56 0.52 5.0** 1.5 1.8 <0.05 n.s. n.s.
Difficulty 2.25 0.55 2.09 0.47 2.51 0.61 2.58 0.43 2.49 0.56 2.92 0.47 30.3*** 0.7 8.9*** <0.001 <0.001 n.s.
Certainty 4.08 0.42 3.99 0.44 4.17 0.42 3.81 0.37 4.07 0.36 3.54 0.48 6.1** 10.5** 5.4** n.s. <0.01 <0.05
neutral (n), moral (m), and legal (l) condition; reaction times reported in seconds, endorsement in rate of yes-answers, other values referring to five-point Likert-scales from 1 to
5;  s.d., *P< 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P< 0.001.
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There was also a significant effect of group [F(1,38)¼ 10.5,
P< 0.01] and a significant group condition interaction
[F(2,76)¼ 5.4, P< 0.01], because other academics were gen-
erally less certain of their judgments than lawyers. Post hoc
tests showed that groups did not differ significantly for the
neutral condition [t(38)¼ 0.66, P> 0.1], but only for the two
normative conditions [moral: t(38)¼ 2.83, P< 0.01; legal:
t(38)¼ 3.96, P< 0.001].
Imaging resultsanalysis I: whole trial
As a first step, we calculated the condition effects for all
subjects, i.e. independent of the groups (Table 2). For the
moral vs the neutral condition, we found activations in
the medial prefrontal cortex (PFC), i.e. the anterior medial
frontal gyrus, and in the left dorsolateral PFC, i.e. the middle
frontal gyrus. We also found stronger activation in the left
superior temporal gyrus (STG) extending into the inferior
parietal lobe (IPL) and thus encompassing the
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), in the posterior cingulate
gyrus (PCG) extending into the precuneus, and in the right
cerebellum.
For the legal vs the neutral condition, we found stronger
activations in the orbitomedial PFC, the dorsomedial PFC
(superior frontal gyrus) and the left dorsolateral PFC, i.e.
in the superior frontal and the middle frontal gyrus. Again,
we found stronger activation in the left STG extending into
the IPL and encompassing the TPJ, in the PCG extending
into the precuneus, and in the right cerebellum.
Additionally, we found stronger activation in the left
middle temporal gyrus. In summary, findings for both
normative conditions as compared with neutral decisions
were very similar, which was confirmed by the conjunction
analysis (see Figure 2). Indeed, a direct statistical comparison
between the moral and the legal condition revealed no sig-
nificant differences at our chosen level of significance in
analysis I.
Imaging resultsanalysis II: decision phase
A comparison between the moral and legal condition inde-
pendent of group yielded stronger activation for the latter in
the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), i.e. in the
middle frontal gyrus, in the middle temporal gyrus and in
the left angular gyrus. These findings are also illustrated by
signal time courses extracted from the respective brain areas
showing a higher increase in BOLD signal in the legal than
the other two conditions during this period, particularly
when approaching the time of decision (see Figure 3).
We checked whether differential (i.e. moral vs legal) activa-
tions in this contrast correlated with differential ratings
of certainty, reality, difficulty and emotion but found no
significant results (r< 0.2 and P> 0.1 for all correlations).
There were no significant differences for the opposite con-
trast, i.e. moral > legal.
The ANCOVAs performed to investigate group differences
and group condition interaction effects yielded a signifi-
cant interaction effect in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), more precisely, in the anterior cingulate gyrus
(see Figure 4). Inspection of ROI GLM data showed a
crossed interaction: lawyers had stronger BOLD responses
Table 2 Main effects of normative conditions
Putative brain area x y z t-max Putative brain area x y z t-max
moral > neutral normative > neutral (conjunction)
l Medial frontal gyrus 5 46 38 5.12 l Superior frontal gyrus/frontal pole 14 55 31 4.92
l Middle frontal gyrus 35 8 50 6.03 l Superior frontal gyrus 17 36 47 5.28
l Superior temporal gyrus 45 56 19 5.98 l Middle frontal gyrus 38 8 50 5.96
l Inferior parietal lobe 34 58 23 7.26 l Superior temporal gyrus 45 55 19 5.98
l Precuneus/PCG 3 59 25 10.79 l Inferior parietal lobe 33 59 24 7.23
r Cerebellum 34 62 37 7.44 l precuneus/ PCG 3 59 25 10.79
r Cerebellum 30 61 36 7.16
legal > neutral legal > moral (decision phase)
l Medial frontal gyrus 3 59 1 5.57 l Middle frontal gyrus 41 49 11 6.25
l Superior frontal gyrus/frontal pole 14 55 31 5 l Middle temporal gyrus 60 35 10 7.2
l Superior frontal gyrus 17 36 50 5.66 l Angular gyrus 35 75 33 6.2
l Superior frontal gyrus 5 14 51 6.13
l Middle frontal gyrus 38 8 50 7.26 condition  group (decision phase)*
l Cingulate gyrus/corpus callosum 15 5 31 5.82 Anterior cingulate gyrus 0 18 22 22.93
l Middle temporal gyrus 60 10 18 5.38
l Precuneus/ PCG 3 59 25 13.25
r Cerebellum 30 61 36 7.78
l Superior temporal gyrus 47 61 21 6.65
l Inferior parietal lobe 33 69 36 8.11
Results are significant on the q(FDR) < 0.005 level; x, y, z ¼ respective coordinates in Talairach space; *corrected on the < 0.005 level and controlling for ratings of difficulty,
reality, certainty and emotion; value from F-statistics.
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Fig. 3 Differences in neural processing comparing the legal to the moral condition. (A) Cluster of stronger activation in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (left middle frontal
gyrus) during legal judgment in a transversal slice at z¼ 13; scale denotes t-values, L¼ left. The corresponding signal time courses (right) from this area illustrate an increasing
difference between the legal and the other two conditions as the point of decision at zero (red vertical line) is approximated; not shifted for BOLD delay, error bars 1 SE.
(B) Cluster of stronger activation in the left middle temporal gyrus in a saggital slice at y¼36; statistics as in (A), P¼ posterior.
Fig. 2 Brain regions related to normative judgment as contrasted with the control condition (conjunction analysis). (A) Transversal view (z¼ 31) showing stronger activations in
the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, the PCG extending into precuneus and the left superior temporal gyrus extending into the inferior parietal lobe, encompassing the
left temporo-parietal-junction (TPJ); scale denotes t-values. (B) Saggital view (x¼34) of the left hemisphere with activations in the middle frontal gyrus and the left TPJ,
statistics as in (A).
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(less deactivation) in this area during legal, other academics
during moral judgment.
DISCUSSION
With our experiment we could show that processing norma-
tive judgments recruit a common set of brain areas irrespec-
tive of the context (moral or legal judgments), comprising
the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), the PCG /pre-
cuneus and the left temporo-parietal-junction (TPJ). These
areas are typically active when thinking about the beliefs and
intentions of others. Moreover, legal judgments were asso-
ciated with significantly stronger activation in the left dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex, suggesting that legal decisions
were made with regard to explicit rules and less intuitively
than moral decisions. Finally, professional lawyers and other
academics show differential involvement of the dorsal ACC
during normative judgments depending on whether they
were made in a moral or a legal context.
Hypothesis 1overlap of brain activations
during moral and legal judgments
Since activations in the frontal, temporal and parietal lobes
as well as in limbic structures have consistently been found
in several fMRI experiments of moral cognition, some
researchers speak of a ‘moral brain’ (see, e.g. Greene and
Haidt, 2002; Moll and de Oliveira-Souza, 2007). Given that
normative decisions in both of our target conditions imply
the attribution of beliefs and intentions, as predicted by the
‘Rawlsian’ model in moral psychology (Hauser, 2006;
Huebner et al., 2009), we expected an overlap of activations
between the moral and the legal condition, particularly of
those brain areas related to mentalizing and TOM, such as
the DMPFC (Walter et al., 2004; Amodio and Frith, 2006;
Singer, 2006; Lieberman, 2007) and the TPJ (Gallagher et al.,
2000; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Frith and Singer, 2008;
Adolphs, 2009).
Comparing either of the two normative conditions to the
control task as well as the conjunction analysis indeed iden-
tified stronger activation in the DMPFC, consistent with our
hypothesis. Furthermore, activations in the superior tempo-
ral gyrus emphasize the importance of the perception and
analysis of goals and intentions for normative judgment,
since this area has been associated with this process of
social cognition previously (Schultz et al., 2004; Young
et al., 2007). However, since this area has traditionally
been related to language processing as well and we used a
verbal task, our finding could indicate a difference in seman-
tic processing for the normative as compared to the neutral
conditions. Nevertheless, a recent meta-analysis of studies
investigating TOM reported that 18 out of 40 had stronger
activation in the STG, 11 using nonverbal paradigms
(Carrington and Bailey, 2009). The activation in the STG
extended into the inferior parietal lobe, encompassing the
TPJ, whose role for belief attribution has been emphasized
frequently (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe
and Kanwisher, 2003; Singer, 2006; Frith and Singer, 2008).
Confirming our hypothesis, our data show neural similarities
between moral and legal judgments, suggesting a consider-
able overlap in cognitive processing between both normative
tasks.
Hypothesis 2differential activation
of legal vs moral judgments
We were interested not only in similarities between moral
and legal decisions but also in their differences. Particularly,
we hypothesized that legal judgments are more related to the
application of rules, as follows from the idealistic under-
standing of law (Gewirtz, 1996; Goodenough, 2001), and
predicted from this hypothesis a stronger activation in the
DLPFC during legal judgment. Focusing on the decision
period of our normative judgment task, where differences
between the moral and the legal condition are most likely
to occur, we could confirm our prediction. The DLPFC has
previously been related to reflecting on explicit rules
(MacDonald et al., 2000; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Bunge,
2004). Taking into consideration that reaction times for
this condition were longer than those for the moral condi-
tion and that the reverse contrast, moral > legal, did not yield
any significant differences, we suggest that moral judgments
are made more intuitively and automatically even in the legal
condition, but that subjects additionally engage in rule-based
decision-making when they are prompted to make a legal
judgment. According to this view, making a legal decision in
our task resembles the overcoming of a prepotent response,
such as in a Stroop-task or a go/no-go paradigm, for which
activation in the DLPFC has also been found previously
(MacDonald et al., 2000 Hester et al., 2004). This interpre-
tation could apply particularly in such instances where sub-
jects consider an action to be morally right, yet legally wrong.
Indeed such situations occurred frequently as is demon-
strated by the significant condition effect on task outcome
Fig. 4 Group condition interaction effect: Activation in the anterior cingulate gyrus
was modulated by subjects’ expertise (analysis II, decision phase; slice at x¼ 0); scale
denotes F-values; mean beta values are shown in the inlay, error bars 1 SE.
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(i.e. endorsement of normative behaviors from the moral or
the legal point of view) that is due to the fact that subjects
were more prohibitive of behaviors in the legal condition.
The DLPFC has also been found by Greene and colleagues
when subjects made ‘utilitarian’ decisions (Greene et al.,
2004), i.e. deciding to sacrifice few lives in order to save
many. According to their interpretation, these decisions are
more rational (but see Kahane and Shackel, 2008; Schleim,
2008), which is consistent with the idealistic understanding
of law we referred to earlier (Gewirtz, 1996; Goodenough,
2001). We would like to emphasize, though, that the differ-
ence between both kinds of normative decisions we are
describing here are a matter of degree and not absolute.
Legal decision-making thus cannot be reduced to the appli-
cation of black letter law on the grounds of our findings.
Also, a caveat to our interpretation is that we did not test
rule application explicitly.
Buckholtz and colleagues also found stronger activation in
the DLPFC in an fMRI study investigating legal decisions
(Buckholtz et al., 2008). However, their finding was located
in the right, not in the left hemisphere as in our case. We
would like to emphasize the difference between their task
and ours to show that both results do not contradict each
other. The subjects in Buckholtz’ and colleagues’ study had
to determine the degree of punishment a certain actor
deserved for his action, while our subjects had to make the
more fundamental decision whether an action was legally
right or not. The judgment of legal rightness precedes that
of legal punishment, since nobody can be legally punished
for an action that is not legally wrong. Both judgments are
thus different steps in the legal decision-making process and
activation in the right DLPFC has been related to punish-
ment in a social interaction task before (Sanfey et al., 2003).
We also found stronger activation in the left middle tem-
poral gyrus for the legal compared to the moral condition. In
a recent meta-analysis, this region has been associated with
semantic tasks (Patterson et al., 2007). More specifically,
Zahn and colleagues related the anterior temporal cortex
to the representation of abstract social semantic knowledge
comprising concepts such as ‘tactless’ or ‘honorable’ regard-
less of emotional valence (Zahn et al., 2007). This finding in
combination with significantly higher reaction times and
ratings of difficulty for legal cases suggests that processing
semantic knowledge from the legal stance is more complex.
Hypothesis 3are lawyers emotionally less
involved in normative judgment?
Our study was designed not only to investigate two kinds of
normative judgment but also to explore two groups with
differences in their normative expertise, that is lawyers and
other academics. Particularly, we hypothesized that lawyers
would pay more attention to normatively salient features
than other academics and in consequence would show less
activation related to processing of emotions, such as the
amygdala (Dalgleish, 2004). While we found such a pattern
in the subjects’ rating of emotional involvement, where law-
yers perceived themselves as significantly less involved
during normative judgment, we could not confirm this
hypothesis on the neural level. This does not directly prove
that our hypothesis is wrong. There is the possibility that the
emotions induced by our normative cognition task are not
strong enough in the first place to elicit significant neural
differences between lawyers and other academics. Regarding
this suggestion it is important to understand that unlike
previous studies employing emotionally dramatic dilemmas
such as choosing to kill one family member in order to save
the remaining family (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Borg et al.,
2006), our scenarios were much less dramatic and our par-
ticipants did not have to imagine themselves as actors in the
plot but evaluated the situations from a third-person per-
spective. Another possibility is that the positive finding for
the subjective ratings of emotional involvement is due to the
lawyers’ wish to conform to a socially desirable ideal type of
legal experts who are less influenced by their passions
(George, 1996; Goodenough, 2001) and that there are
indeed no differences in the way lawyers and other aca-
demics process their decisions neurally in our paradigm. If
this was true, it would mean that lawyers reacted just as
emotionally as other academics in contrast to their training
to be less emotional and their belief that they were indeed so.
We tried to investigate these questions with additional anal-
yses, but splitting both groups into high- and low-emotional
subgroups did not yield any evidence to resolve them (see
Supplementary AnalysisEmotional processing).
Leaving aside the question of emotional involvement, we
found an interaction effect of condition and group in the
dorsal ACC when controlling for the differences as measured
in the post-experimental rating procedure. The dorsal ACC
has been associated with attention modulation (Kondo et al.,
2004; Crottaz-Herbette and Menon, 2006) and, more specif-
ically, the ACC’s subregion we found, belonging to the pos-
terior part of the rostral MFC according to Amodio and
Frith (2006), has frequently been related to cognitive tasks
(Bush et al., 2000; Amodio and Frith, 2006). This response
pattern is hard to interpret, as the dACC is involved in mul-
tiple functions and we had no specific a priori hypothesis on
its activation. As a possible explanation we suggest a
task-switching explanation, associating the difference in
ACC activation with the subjects’ capacity to apply their
expertise in order to solve the normative judgment task
that requires a shift in attention from the respective case
to their learned knowledge. However, when they are per-
forming the judgment for which they have less expertise,
they have to rely more on their intuitions and thus engage
in less cognitive processing. However, a post hoc analysis
performed to probe whether legal expertise has a modulating
effect on DLPFC activation did not yield significant results
(see Supplementary AnalysisLevel of expertise). While our
explanation thus remains just a guess at this point, we hope
that our observation inspires future research to consider the
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ACC as a region of interest to test its precise role in the
modulation of expertise in normative judgment.
CONCLUSION
We could show that the normative context in which subjects
evaluate a certain situation matters on the behavioral as well
as on the neural level. Our hypotheses concerning the spe-
cificity of the ‘moral brain’ and differences between moral
and legal decisions could be confirmed, suggesting that
several brain regions previously associated with moral cog-
nition, particularly the DMPFC, the left STG and TPJ, are
also related to legal judgment and that legal decisions are
rather made by applying explicit rules than by relying on
intuitions, as indicated by stronger activation in the left
DLPFC. Our hypothesis concerning group differences of
emotional involvement between lawyers and other aca-
demics could only be confirmed on the self-assessed behav-
ioral, not on the neural, level. Additionally, we found a
significant group condition interaction effect in the ACC
possibly suggesting that the subjects’ expertise triggers atten-
tion shifts. This situation calls for further research to clarify
the impact of expertise on normative judgments. Since both
groups in our study were strictly matched for education and
our stimulus material was adapted from real issues reported
in the media, it is likely that other academics were also famil-
iar with the legal issues as is supported by the similar ratings
of how realistic the presented cases were. We would thus like
to emphasize the possibility that other experimental designs
could identify more differences related to the subjects’ exper-
tise than we were able to find.
While others have argued that neuroimaging results
related to normative issues will change the way we think
about law and morals (Greene and Cohen, 2004; Singer,
2005), we think that it is currently too early to draw any
firm normative conclusions from our findings. With our
study, we were able to show that there is more to learn
about the way the brain processes normatively relevant
information as can be understood by focusing on morals
alone. Both domains are instances of norms related to
right and wrong human conduct and as suggested by our
data, it matters in which light we see normative issues.
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Supplementary Data are available at SCAN Online.
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